Manmohan deserves Nishaan-e-Pakistan

Viewed from the perspective of India, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s latest peace overture to a recalcitrant Pakistan seems bewildering and a trifle misplaced. How, it is being legitimately asked, can you repose trust in a Pakistan that is unwilling to own up to its misdemeanours and, indeed, is content with the mollycoddling of extremist and terrorist forces? Just because Atal Bihari Vajpayee too was guilty of a similar misjudgement doesn’t necessarily justify its persistence.

Yet, it is important to realise that India’s desperate desire to give its difficult neighbour the benefit of doubt is not an isolated move prompted by some weakness of the national character. Pakistan, which was worsted after the 9/11 attacks and the Anglo-American ‘war on terror’, is on the verge of recovering lost ground and scoring a major foreign policy triumph. This is not because the Manmohan Singh regime is weak and supine. That is only a small part of the problem. The real advantage for Pakistan lies in the fact that an economically devastated West has lost the political resolve to persist with the war in Afghanistan. It is looking for ways to extricate itself from what is generally being regarded as a no-win situation. What India is doing is creating the conditions for an ignominious Anglo-American retreat from Afghanistan. Being nice to Pakistan is a part of India’s facilitation process.

The extent to which defeatism has overwhelmed the West is most evident in the hysterical British reaction to the death of 22 of its soldiers last month. The July toll may seem small by Indian standards — the Maoists have killed more policemen and para-military forces in Chhattisgarh in the same time frame — but in British eyes this is unacceptable. From the perspective of other European participants in the multi-national force it is even more so. The only German soldier who killed a Taliban insurgent had to be flown back home for trauma therapy and the legendary Luftwaffe has ceased all night operations because it is seen as too risky.

There was a naive belief in some European capitals that involvement in Afghanistan actually meant overseeing good works by social workers in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The soldiers, it was assumed, would keep a benign eye on things as earnest young do-gooders helped Afghans rebuild schools, practice gender equality and climb up the Human Development Index. When that romantic dream turned into a nightmare amid the harsh realities of Afghanistan, the inclination of European civil society has been to cut losses and run back home.

The Afghan war is without question an unpopular war. The Americans may want more boots on the ground and a few targeted operations, including the one with the menacing name Operation Panther’s Claw, but this is widely seen as a face-saving precursor to departure. Maybe the bases in Baghran and Kandahar may remain, but for all intents and purposes, the war on terror is drawing to a close without any sign of victory.

For Pakistan, this is fantastic news and it is doing its utmost to hasten the departure of the international forces. Having carefully helped the Taliban regroup after the debacle of 2001 and continue its low-intensity guerrilla war, Pakistan is now intent on projecting itself as the proverbial poacher-turned-gamekeeper. It has implored the West to outsource the pacification of Pushtuns to it. After all, no one is said to know the forbidding terrain around the Durand Line better than Pakistan. In return, Pakistan wants the West to create the conditions for its ‘approved’ intervention in Afghanistan.

Ideally, Pakistan has two demands. First, it wants the West to guarantee that the shift of military might from the eastern front with India to the western front will not involve India taking advantage of the situation. Second, Pakistan wants the West to realise that it would be difficult to manage the internal fallout of training its guns on the Taliban unless there is some ideological compensation, such as some recognition of Pakistan’s role in Kashmir. As of now, the West has merely impressed upon India the need to free Pakistani forces in the east so that it can join the main battle in the west. For India, this has meant lowering the temperature on Pakistan-sponsored terrorism directed against India. As of now, the West hasn’t really arm-twisted India on the Kashmir issue. But that is only a matter of time. New Delhi has already demonstrated its inclination to crawl when asked to bend.

The coming months are going to be crucial for Afghanistan. On the face of it, President Hamid Karzai seems set for a clear victory in next month’s presidential election. However, it is clear that both Pakistan and the so-called civil society groups in the West are betting on his ex-World Bank rival Ashraf Ghani as a wholesome alternative to Karzai. Ghani has the support of the anti-Karzai Pushtuns but lacks the incumbent’s ability to garner the votes of the minority communities linked to the erstwhile Northern Alliance.

The presidential election isn’t likely to be entirely free and fair. Given the troubled state of Afghanistan, it can hardly be so. Moreover, the democratic culture hasn’t really taken roots in Afghanistan. Any result that favours Karzai is likely to be strongly disputed by the Ghani camp and the scepticism is certain to be fuelled by both Pakistan and Western Governments anxious to leave Afghanistan to god and Pakistan. It is a possible man-made crisis over the election results that may well set the stage for Pakistan’s formal re-acquisition of its lost ‘strategic depth’.

By refusing to play hard ball in Egypt last month, Manmohan Singh thought he was trying to help the West get its act together in Pakistan. The consequences of his generosity may well be Pakistan’s victory in Afghanistan. The Indian Prime Minister deserves a Nishaan-e-Pakistan award.

Policy needs to be changed

In diplomacy, messages are often not direct or straightforward. Sometimes lessons from one theatre have relevance for another. The belligerence of North Korean dictator Kim Jong II over the past few weeks is a sobering reminder of how things can go wrong if a paramount power decides to speak softly without waving a big stick.

On May 25, Pyongyang tested a nuclear device. A North Korean ship is currently on the high seas, apparently carrying an illegal cargo of missiles and other weaponry to Burma. On July 4, Independence Day in the United States, Mr Kim has promised to fire a missile in the direction of Hawaii.

The expected range of the Taepodong-2 is 6,500 km and Hawaii is just over 7,000 km from the launch site. Chances of the missile entering American waters/territory are small, but it will travel over Japan. On the whole, it will be the most serious infraction in the US’s Pacific region since Pearl Harbour.

It is ironical the North Korean leader’s muscle-flexing has taken place only months after a new and supposedly conciliatory resident arrived at the White House. After all, US President Barack Obama’s team made effusive noises about the conduct of foreign policy that would be different from President George W Bush’s sledgehammer, “with us or against us”, approach.

How did North Korea behave in the Bush years? As far back as 2002, Mr Bush named the Pyongyang regime as part of the “Axis of Evil”. In 2003, Pyongyang withdrew from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and in 2006 tested a nuclear device. The then American President pushed for economic sanctions and used China — the one country with influence on Mr Kim — to bring North Korea to the negotiating table.

North Korea did not give up its clandestine mission. Nevertheless, it checked itself. There were no overt displays of aggression. Mr Kim agreed to shut down some nuclear facilities. He recognised that in Mr Bush he had an implacable foe, one who would hit back and hit back hard if provoked.

Six months after the Republican President left Washington, DC, the North Korean megalomaniac has triggered an East Asian crisis. He has reneged on his promise to close nuclear installations and reverted to Bomb-making.

What does this tell us about Mr Kim and about political adventurism in general? The North Koreans have indicated they don’t think much of the Obama crowd, they see America’s resolve as weakening. They have also paid a left-handed compliment to Mr Bush —acknowledging he put the fear of god into them.

There are three implications to the crisis. First, it will give others ideas. Teheran has already more or less rebuffed Mr Obama’s offer of talks. In backing the wrong horse in the recent election — and misreading the mood of the Iranian people — the US State Department didn’t help its cause.

Of course, domestic unrest in Iran is at its most potent in some 30 years and this will allow the Americans to claim the moral high ground. However, it will amount to a tactical rather than strategic advantage. In the larger reckoning, Mr Obama cannot talk his way out of trouble on the Iranian front.

In the battle against Osama bin Laden and the international army of Islamists, Mr Obama has not backed down, but he has occasionally sent ambivalent signals. His speech in Cairo earlier this month pandered to the sort of negativism and overdone self-pity that is the staple of Al Qaeda apologists.

Perhaps Mr Obama was only using the polite phrases to set the stage for stern decisions. That remains a prospect for the future. For the moment, the Cairo speech can only be seen in isolation, and can get very qualified applause.

Second, Mr Obama is being put to test. He came into office with limited experience and with the reputation of being a foreign policy lightweight. To be fair, Mr Bush too had very little international exposure in January 2001, but was backed by a formidable Republican machine.

In contrast, Mr Obama’s original foreign policy advisers — some of whom he has despatched to relatively inconsequential posts in the United Nations — were the liberal extreme of his country’s strategic affairs establishment. Mr Obama campaigned on a theme that promised to end wars, not take the US further into conflict, work within multilateral systems, be cautious rather than impulsive.

All of that sounds nice — until one is faced with a first-rate, real-life crisis. If North Korea indeed gets a missile close enough to Hawaii, Mr Obama will encounter media frenzy. What will he do?

In a sense, this could lead to a microcosmic examination of the theory which holds that, if a 9/11-style attack were to repeat itself in his presidency, Mr Obama will be obliged to strike back with greater lethality than Mr Bush. His political and personal background will make it difficult for him to do otherwise, lest the public see him as ‘weak’.

Third, Afghanistan or Pakistan, North Korea or Iran, even India or China: The more Mr Obama tries to distance himself from the Bush template, the closer he moves towards it.

Mr Obama’s broader strategy for the war on terrorism is no different from the one Mr Bush set out. His easy touch has not worked with North Korea and Iran and sooner or later tough measures will be called for to tackle two nuclear programmes that America and its allies — in two separate parts of Asia — see as non-negotiable. For all the early camaraderie with Beijing and neglect of New Delhi, recent interactions between the Obama team and Indian interlocutors suggest the honeymoon with China is going to be short-lived.

Different global environments call for different modes of diplomacy. After 9/11, Mr Bush correctly calculated the world was headed for a Hobbesian interlude. Maverick actors — dictators like Kim, freelance commanders like bin Laden, mobster institutions like the Pakistani Army — would need to be treated with a mix of straight talk and unvarnished power projection.

That realism was a critical element of the Bush doctrine. It remains the former President’s most abiding foreign policy legacy. Mr Obama can paint it in another colour, give it a new name; ultimately, he has to embrace it.

Pak: A failed State with a crashing future

As is often said, Pakistan is a failed State. This is an understatement if one bothers to check with reality. The powers that be in Pakistan are living under a make-believe utopia. True, they have delivered a shock by attacking Mumbai, killing around 200 people, many of them being very important persons. But there is no doubt that India is a bigger and better military power with credible nuclear and missile armaments. It has been tested on ground on as many as four times, and on all the four occasions the war was initiated by Pakistan. But everytime, Pakistan was defeated by India decisively. In Kargil, though Pakistan was in an advantageous position, the brave jawans of India still defeated Pakistan capturing peak after peak. However, the US managed a honourable retreat for Pakistan.

The military masters of Pakistan still weave the dream of capturing India by 2020. A map has been circulated in Pakistan’s Army to boost the morale of their jawans, which shows areas of UP, Haryana, Punjab, Himachal, and J&K as part of the target area to be annexed by 2012. It also shows Mumbai as Muslimabad and, perhaps, the Capital with half of Karnataka, Andhra and half of coastal Maharashtra to be annexed by 2020. The secret paper demarcates most of south India as disputed territory. This map has somehow reached to one RC Ganju, an expert on Kashmir and Pakistan.

Someone must be dreaming and weaving utopia. After all, the e-mail that was circulated by the terrorists before Delhi blasts were clear in their aims and objectives of disintegration of India and its Islamisation. This is clearly a lunatic thinking.

Let us come to the country where such people can manage to attain high ranks in the army and the Government. In fact, today Pakistan is standing at a more dangerous point of its history than it was in 1971 and it is not because of India. The perception created in Pakistan is that India is its biggest enemy. But, as a matter of fact, India has acted as a biggest unifier of Pakistan. The Pak army is not only Punjabiased, but is also Islamised. Islamisation of the army has created more problems than solving it. It has destroyed the civil society to a great extent, barring two States.

The Baluch are struggling for their basic rights. Whosoever of them happens to meet an Indian, requests him to liberate them from Pakistan. They scream that they do not want to live under the clutches of brute Pakistanis. The FATA area of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), from where Taliban launched several attacks on Soviets in Afghanistan, is practically under Taliban’s control. More and more areas of NWFP has gone under Taliban’s control. U.S. wants Pak army to create a pressure in that area, but Pakistan is moving its army from there under the cover of engaging India on the eastern borders. Pak army today is factionalised and, to some extent, demoralised.

So far as the economy of Pakistan is concerned, all the indices have particularly bottomed out. Foreign currency reserves are hardly sufficient for a few weeks. Industrialisation has a bleak outlook. The military elite have sucked all the vitals of whatever economic wealth it possessed. It is living on artificial respiration from IMF, courtesy the US. It cannot fight India without Arab money and without China’s or US help. All these helps operating together are almost impossible. Terror machines at the hands of private individuals and seminaries are enormous. Moreover, people, especially the younger generation, are angered against US and, therefore, against its own Government. Society and the Government are the victims of their own terror factories. Today, in most areas, these terror factories are not under the control of Pakistan Government.

The attack on Mumbai has isolated Pakistan. Almost all countries, including many Muslim countries, have condemned Pakistan for the Mumbai terrorist attack. Pakistan lost all credibility. All its responses carry no weight in International affairs. In Pakistan today, there are said to be one crore eight lakh unlicensed weapons, that too sophisticated ones. There are over ten lacs young people being trained in extremist universities. What is more dangerous is that more than half of them are unemployed and angry. They can do anything and kill anybody, just for money. Therefore, there is abundance of human supply in the Fidayeen market.

Many scholars of international repute like Stephen P Cohen say that today there is no country other than Pakistan, that is more dangerous. It has everything that Osama-bin-Laden could have asked for: “political instability, crusted radical Islamists, abundance of angry young western recruits, secluded training areas, access to state-of-the-art electronic technology, regular air service to west and security services, which do not always work as they are supposed to (Newsweek January, 2008).”

It needs no expert to conclude that Pakistan has a bloody past and the future of a crashing plane, whenever it happens

A bogus war on Taliban

Pakistan’s offensive, involving severe fighting and heavy casualties, which has reportedly cleared the Swat Valley, Buner and Lower Dir and other tribal areas of Taliban fighters, has been regarded as an indication of Islamabad’s determination to wipe out fundamentalist Islamist terrorism from its soil. Is that so? What does it mean for India?

The trouble is that the Pakistani Army’s claims of success lack adequate independent corroboration. A report by Dexter Filkin in the New York Times of May 8, stated that there was no way of verifying the claims by the Pakistani military’s chief spokesman, Maj Gen Athar Abbas, as newspersons and most outsiders had been blocked from the areas. It further quoted a woman in a refugee camp in Mardan as stating, “The Army and the Taliban are not killing each other — they are friends. They are only killing civilians. When civilians are killed, the Government claims they have killed a bunch of terrorists.”

A report by Jane Perlez and Pir Zubair Shah, published in the New York Times of May 19, about urban guerrilla warfare confronting Pakistani Army as it closed in on Mingora, quotes a statement by the military as claiming that it had started clearing houses in Kanju, a village in the outskirts of Mingora, and residents who had left Kanju described a mounting civilian death toll. It then added, “The Pakistani Army has closed Swat to outsiders and essentially ordered residents to leave. The authorities have also mostly barred journalists from entering the area, making it difficult to verify what is happening.”

Unverified claims by the military are difficult to accept at face value given the latter’s — and the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate’s — close ties with the Taliban. As it has been known for a long time, and as Pakistan’s President, Mr Asif Ali Zardari admitted recently, the ISI and the CIA jointly created the Taliban in 1994. According to a report by Elisabeth Bumiller in the New York Times of April 1, Ms Michelle A Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, acknowledged before the US Senate Armed Services Committee, the US Administration’s concern about a wing of the ISI, which American intelligence officers said was providing money and military assistance to the Taliban in Afghanistan. Under sharp questioning by Sen John McCain, she said that she thought the ISI or at least parts of the latter — were “certainly a problem to be dealt with”.

One has doubtless seen television news clips of the Pakistani Army directing artillery fire and rockets. But at whom? A report by Carlotta Gall and Elisabeth Bumiller in the New York Times of April 28, stated, “After strong criticism here and abroad over its inaction, the Pakistani military deployed fighter jets and helicopter gunships to flush out hundreds of Taliban militants who overran the strategic district of Buner last week.” The Taliban, however, had started retreating from Buner on April 24 under orders from its leader in Swat, Maulana Fazlullah.

According to television channels, the order followed a meeting between Taliban leaders Qari Muhammad Khan and Muslim Khan and the Commissioner of the Malakand division, Syed Muhammad Javed, in the presence of Maulvi Sufi Mohammad, the founder of Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Sharia-e Mohammadi (Movement for the Establishment of Islamic Law) who acted as an intermediary. Further, television channels showed dozens of militants, masked and heavily-armed, driving away in pick-up trucks and minibuses. Muslim Khan, the Taliban spokesman, said on April 25 that all militants who had come from Swat had withdrawn and that only local Taliban fighters from Buner remained in the area. He, however, did not mention how many had left and how many remained. Yet heavy fighting was reported from Buner district on May 6. Surely, “local Taliban” alone could not have held out for so long!

Clearly, there is more in the whole thing than meets the eye. Pakistani leaders, of course, have been talking stridently. Asked to clarify Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani’s statement that the objective of the north-western operations was “to eliminate the militants and terrorists”, Mr Zardari told a television channel during his state visit to the US in early May, “This means clearing out the area of the miscreants and bringing life to normalcy.” Asked if “eliminate” meant “killing them all”, he replied, “That’s what it means.” But then not all of Mr Zardari’s and Mr Gilani’s statements can be taken at face value. Besides, the Army can overrule both. After the terrorist attack on Mumbai on November 26 last year, they promised to send the ISI’s Director-General, Lt Gen Ahmad Shuja Pasha, to Delhi to help in the investigations. Mr Zardari finally admitted in an interview with NBC news on May 10 what had been known from very beginning — that the Army did not let him send Lt Gen Pasha!

Clearly, it is too early to say how successful the Pakistani Army’s offensive has been and how far the Army will go in dealing with the Taliban and the Al Qaeda. It is one thing to clear Swat, Buner, Lower Dir and Shangli districts of militants, and quite another to wipe out the Taliban headed by Mullah Omar and the Al Qaeda headed by Osama bin Laden. With both untouched, Taliban militants retreating in the face of the Pakistani Army’s offensive will be sheltered in their strongholds in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas just as the Taliban and Al Qaeda elements fleeing from Afghanistan in the face of the US and the Northern Alliance’s offensive in November 2001 had been sheltered by organisations like Lashkar-e-Tayyeba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, courtesy the ISI.

They will return when the going is good again. For it is one thing to drive the Taliban out and another to hold the territory thus cleared. Has Pakistan the political will to do that? Finally, the offensive does not mean that Pakistan would also act against the LeT and the JeM which it has created to stage terrorist strikes against India. Indeed, the release of Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, head of the LeT and mastermind of the attack on Mumbai on the ground of there being “insufficient” evidence against him, clearly indicates that Pakistan’s sptonsorship of cross-border terrorism against this country will continue.

Pakistan an overview:Zardari,gilani,sharif,army ;making mockery of democracy

Pakistan is today in a tailspin. Extremists and terrorists have captured significant portions of the country's western border areas. Political brinkmanship is pushing the rest of the country into turmoil. Streets of Punjab are witnessing the return of unrest and violence. Pakistan is seething, simmering and slowly disintegrating from its edges. A reluctant and bruised Army is waiting at the doorsteps. There are strong apprehensions of a coup, barely a year after the last military regime exited.

With events overtaking hopes with such a dizzying speed, predicting the immediate future of Pakistan will be like writing on sand. Few assumptions can, however, be made, both for the short and long term, without being swept away by the turbulent events which are likely to intensify in the days ahead.

One thing is sure: President Asif Ali Zardari's days are numbered. An outsider in Pakistan's politics, the February 2008 elections offered him the unique chance of turning the country's face towards a democratic future after nine years of military rule. He blew it within six months of his election. As President he chose confrontation over reconciliation with his political opponents. Though there are attempts to persuade Zardari to compromise with his political opponents, the Sharif brothers, and some kind of rapprochement might be brokered, it will be of the most temporary kind. Both the opponents have gone too far down the road to turn the clock back to March 2008 when they decided to jettison their traditional rivalries and form a coalition in Islamabad.

Zardari, by his sheer dumb-ass attitude, has created enemies within his own party. The most vocal has been the man he picked up from obscurity to be the Prime Minister, Yousaf Raza Gillani. An anti-Zardari feeling within the party had been gathering storm ever since the President brusquely sidelined all the Benazir Bhutto loyalists, relying more on his friends and associates to run the party and the government. With Zardari committing hara-kiri, the anti-Zardari group has rallied behind Gillani, giving this political lightweight enough scope to speak out against the President in public.

If events turn out in favour of Gillani against Zardari, it would be the second blow for the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), the only political party in Pakistan with support bases across all provinces which has stood up, despite its feudal hierarchy and functioning, against the complete military takeover of the country's political process. The first was the brutal assassination of Benazir Bhutto and the mantle of leadership falling in the laps of Zardari, a corrupt manipulator whose survival instincts have so far been a shade better than a cockroach.

PPP has far remained a vanguard of democracy in Pakistan. Zardari has rendered the party its fatal wound and irrespective of events, the party would witness a break-up in the months ahead. It is today rudderless; Gillani is not a charismatic leader and most important he is not a Bhutto. Zardari, a victim of his own cunning, has shown no commitment or ability to keep his party united and strong. There are other leaders in the party, some with the capability, and character, to lead the party but most of them are provincial leaders and do not have the charisma of a Benazir to gather the demoralised flock to present a unified front against the party opponents, and the Army.

Another certainty is the street power of the middle-class in Pakistan. This is a new phenomenon and is likely to gather momentum as the country struggles with its past follies. In 2007, when lawyers and others came out on the streets after President Pervez Musharraf sacked the Supreme Court Chief Justice, many thought it to be a short-lived phenomenon. When the street protests brought down the once-powerful Musharraf to his knees within months, it was quite clear that people had won over the military. The present round of street protests has naturally raised the spectre of a repeat of 2007, which is not exactly against Zardari alone but, must remember, is built on the demand for the restoration of the judiciary. This has far too deeper ramifications than merely political.

For one, Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary was sacked in March 2007 because he was trying to put the Army on the defensive about several people, many of them strong opponents of Musharraf and his policies, who were made to disappear in the guise of War on Terror. Chaudhary was browbeaten and sacked in the presence of the present Army Chief, General Ashfaq Kayani. The street protests that ran like wild fire ended in the resignation of Musharraf. It was one of the most serious blows to the supremacy of the Army in Pakistan's history. Kayani is well aware that street protests this time around would only make the Army's position more unstable in a country where at least some sections of the people are showing signs of `military fatigue`. This does not augur well for the Army which has ruled the country on and off during the past six decades.

Therefore, it has made the Army's proclivity to remove civilian leaders and take over the reigns quite a difficult task under the present circumstances. Kayani knows that a coup at this time would invite a massive public wrath, and this time not only would the lawyers be out on the streets but others too. So a coup in the immediate future is not in sight.

What is therefore likely to happen in Pakistan is to somehow keep the present civilian government in place with or without Zardari (he has already been given a deadline to clean up the act or get out), to restore Punjab to the Sharif brothers or at least to their party and return to the western frontier where the Taliban and its allies have been knocking at the gates for the last two years. Gillani has cleverly positioned himself to take over from Zardari and the Army sees no threat from Gillani as the head of the State. The Sharif brothers too have declared that they would support Gillani. There are, however, several `buts and ifs` to such a proposition. An anonymous bullet, for instance, can unsettle this equation.

What should be more worrying to India is that peace and stability in Pakistan can never be taken for granted. There are too many negatives at work in the country. Ironically, the street protests, which many consider a sign of the unravelling of Pakistan, indicate a glimmer of possibility of people's voice finally getting heard. This is bad for the Army, but good for the country. It is too early to be optimistic. There are too many vested interests within and outside the country which, unlike India, would rather see Pakistan in turmoil.

Awatansh Tripathi

ISI & The role of Pakistan in "war on terror"

Much is now being made of the 'indigenisation' of Islamist extremism and terrorism in India as purportedly opposed to the earlier Pakistan-backed terrorist activities. It is crucial, at this juncture, to scotch emerging misconceptions on this count. Islamist terrorism in India has always had an Indian face -- but has overwhelmingly been engineered and directed from Pakistan, and nothing has changed in this scenario. Going back to the March 1993 serial explosions in Mumbai, which killed 257 people and left 713 injured, and were executed by the Dawood Ibrahim gang, for instance, it is useful to recall that nearly 1,800 kg of RDX and a large number of detonators and small arms had been smuggled from Pakistan through India's west coast prior to the bombings. The operation was coordinated by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, and Ibrahim and a number of his gang members have since lived under state protection in Karachi.

Similarly, Al Ummah, which was responsible for a series of 19 explosions in February 1998, which left 50 people dead in the Coimbatore district of Tamil Nadu, and which had established a wide network of extremist organisations across south India, was also aided by Pakistan, with a considerable flow of funds from Pakistan-based terror groups, often through the Gulf. The Deendar Anjuman, headed by Zia-ul-Hassan, which orchestrated a series of 13 explosions in churches in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Goa between May and July 2000, was, again, bankrolled by the ISI.

The then Union Minister for Home Affairs had stated in Parliament that investigators had established linkages between the Deendar Anjuman and Pakistan's covert intelligence agency. Hassan himself was based at Peshawar in Pakistan, where the sect was established under the name of Anjuman Hizbullah, and he is said to have floated a militant group, the Jamaat-e-Hizb-ul-Mujahiddeen in Pakistan, in order to 'capture India and spread Islam'.

It is entirely within this paradigm that the evolution of Students Islamic Movement of India as a terrorist group is located. Absent the support and involvement of Pakistan's covert agencies and an enduring partnership with a range of Pakistan-based or backed terrorist groups, SIMI may have had an amateur flirtation with terrorism, an impulse that would quickly have been exhausted with a handful of low-grade and at least occasionally accidental bomb blasts. Instead, its leadership and cadre have had a long apprenticeship alongside Pakistani terrorist groups operating in Jammu & Kashmir, and several of the more promising candidates have crossed the border to secure 'advanced training' on Pakistani soil or in Bangladesh.

The control centre of SIMI has, for some time now, been based in Pakistan. Operational command in a number of major attacks, including the Samjhauta Express bombing of February 18, 2007, and the two serial attacks in Hyderabad in May and August 2007, was known to have been exercised by Mohammed Shahid aka Bilal. Bilal was reported to have been shot in Karachi in September 2007, and, while Indian intelligence sources remain sceptical, no confirmed sighting has subsequently been reported. Operational control thereafter has shifted to the Lahore-based second-in-command, Mohammad Amjad.

I have repeatedly emphasised the fact that Pakistan's ISI -- as an organ of the country's military and political establishment -- has been, and remains, the principal source of the impetus, the infrastructure and the organisational networks of what is inaccurately called 'Islamist' terrorism across the world. An overwhelming proportion of so-called 'Islamist' terrorism is, in fact, simply 'ISI terrorism'.

While the Indian establishment remains unusually coy about this reality -- with fitful and often quickly qualified exception -- some measure of satisfaction may now be derived from a growing American recognition of Pakistan's pernicious role as an abiding source of Islamist terrorism. Had this recognition come in the first weeks after 9/11, that could have saved thousands of lives, most significantly in Afghanistan and India, but also in Europe and across Asia.

Nevertheless, Western commentators and Governments are now increasingly acknowledging Pakistan's duplicity in the 'global war on terror', the proclivity to act as an 'on-and-off ally of Washington'. While providing fitful cooperation in US anti-terrorism efforts, The Washington Times notes, "in other ways, Pakistan aids and abets terror. US officials say that Pakistan's spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence... was behind the recent bombing of India's Embassy in Kabul. And the Pakistani Government's refusal to confront Al Qaeda has helped create a de facto safe haven for the group and its allies in locations like the Federally Administered Tribal Areas region of Pakistan".

US Intelligence officials, The Washington Times notes further, compare "Al Qaeda's operational and organisational advantages in the FATA to those it enjoyed in Afghanistan prior to September 11", and warn that "Al Qaeda was training and positioning its operatives to carry out attacks in the West, probably including the United States".

These disclosures coincide with reports that President George W Bush had secretly approved orders in July 2008, allowing American Special Operations forces to carry out ground assaults inside Pakistan without the prior approval of the Pakistani Government. US Forces have executed numerous missile attacks from unmanned Predator drones on Pakistani soil in the past, but the September 3, 2008, attack by NATO and US ground troops at a Taliban-Al Qaeda stronghold in South Waziristan was the first instance in which troops had participated. The incident has already been followed by drone attacks on September 9 on a seminary run by Jalaluddin Haqqani, in which 20 people, including some senior Al Qaeda operatives, were killed; and on September 12 at Tul Khel in North Waziristan, in which an Al Badr Mujahideen commander was targeted. Haqqani, it is significant, was known to have engineered the attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul, using a LeT suicide cadre Hamza Shakoor, a Pakistani from Gujranwala district, on behalf of the ISI.

The increasing frequency of US-NATO attacks -- manned or unmanned -- into Pakistani territory, and the Bush Administration's approval of Special Operations into Pakistan without prior sanction from Islamabad, has reconfirmed the country's status as a safe haven for Islamist terrorists and an area of growing anxiety for the world. There is, however, still very little understanding of how heavy and sustained the Pakistani footprint has been in Islamist terrorist activities across the globe. The enormity of this 'footprint' is, for instance, reflected in the long succession of terrorist incidents, arrests and seizures, separately, in India, the US and Europe, in which a Pakistani link has been suspected or confirmed.

Awatansh Tripathi